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a b s t r a c t 
Investor preference for local stocks provides a quasi-experimental setting to investigate 
whether the market rewards ﬁrms that comply with generally accepted accounting princi- 
ples. We show ﬁrms with low earnings quality trade at a premium compared to ﬁrms in 
compliance with accounting principles; the difference in values is greater when the role 
of local investor over-trading is stronger in stock price-formation, in other words for the 
more isolated ﬁrms. The value of the information not conveyed to the market through 
accounting disclosure accounts for 30% of the market-to-book. Results are robust to earn- 
ings quality deﬁnition, and show while non-local investors are sensitive to the quality of 
accounting information, local and better-informed investors are not. Overall, accounting 
quality matters. 
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 1. Introduction 
The global ﬁnancial crisis of 20 07–20 08 highlighted a fundamental need for transparency in corporate practices (e.g.,
Arnold, 2009; Barth and Landsman, 2011 ). For more than 40 years, the literature has been calling for more informative
accounting disclosures and increased emphasis on detecting earnings management and fraudulent reporting (e.g., Chung et
al., 2009; Dechow et al., 2010; Kothari, 2001; Lahr, 2014 ). Interestingly, research on compliance does not provide a clear
picture on the relationship between ﬁrms’ reporting quality and ﬁnancial consequences, and whether the market rewards
compliance with accounting principles is also unclear (e.g., Bhattacharya et al., 2003; Chan et al., 2006; Core et al., 2008;
Francis et al., 2005; Morricone et al., 2009 ). Francis et al., (2005) show that reporting quality matters since investors price
securities based on their awareness of accruals quality. On the other hand, Core et al., (2008) ﬁnd no evidence that accruals
quality is a priced risk factor and Lev (1989) suggests only a weak correlation between stock market returns and earnings
disclosure, concluding that ‘ earnings manipulation is prevalent; but, except for egregious cases, it is hard to detect and prosecute ’
( Lev, 2003 , p. 48). 
This paper exploits the quasi-experimental setting provided by investor tendency to overinvest in geographically proxi-
mate, or local stocks (the so-called Local Home Bias) (e.g., Coval and Moskowitz, 1999; Cumming and Johan, 2006 ) to inves-
tigate whether the market rewards ﬁrms that comply with accounting principles. The Local Home Bias is double-faced in∗ Corresponding author. 
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 nature. On one side, it stems from information advantages on local ﬁrms: proximity gives investors greater value-relevant in-
formation about the local ﬁrms, leading investors to prefer local ﬁrms over non-local ﬁrms (e.g., Coval and Moskowitz, 2001;
Cumming and Dai, 2010; Ivkovi ´c and Weisbenner, 2005 ). On the other hand, behavioural factors also come into play (e.g.,
Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2001; Levis et al., 2015; Shan and Gong, 2012 ). For instance, Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001) provide
evidence that shareholders are more likely to trade in local stocks when the issuing ﬁrm CEO communicates in the same
language as the investor or shares the same cultural background. This investor preference for local stocks even affects corpo-
rate market values (e.g., Baschieri et al., 2015; Hong et al., 2008; Korniotis and Kumar, 2013b ). In fact, since a portion of local
investor wealth will be invested in local equity, the lower the number of local ﬁrms, the higher the amount of local wealth
invested in each local ﬁrm. As a result, isolated ﬁrms trade at a premium compared to non-isolated ﬁrms. In addition, as
they are more informed, local investors ask for lower returns on local ﬁrms. Therefore, with respect to clustered ﬁrms the
isolated ﬁrms beneﬁt from a larger clientele of local investors asking for lower returns, and ultimately have higher market
values. 
The investor preference for local equity provides a quasi-experimental setting to test whether the market rewards com-
pliance with accounting principles as the Local Home Bias disentangles the accounting information, or the information
available to both local and non-local investors, from the local information, which is only available to local investors. Firms
with full disclosure and high earnings quality, or ﬁrms that fully comply with accounting principles, are identical to both
local and non-local investors, causing the information advantage for local investors to vanish. On the other hand, ﬁrms with
partial disclosure and low earnings quality, or opaque ﬁrms, allow local investors to gain a valuable informational advantage
as partial disclosure increases the information risk 1 for non-local investors. Therefore, they tend to shy away from opaque
ﬁrms or, ask for higher returns in compensation for larger information asymmetries, while local investors move towards
opaque local ﬁrms, trying to exploit their information advantage. This turn of events creates an apparent paradox, where
ﬁrms with low earnings quality trade at a premium compared to ﬁrms with high earnings quality; the difference in ﬁrm
values is greater when the role of local investor over-trading is stronger in stock price-formation, in other words for the
more isolated ﬁrms. Therefore, we argue that the more a ﬁrm is isolated from other listed ﬁrms, the more a ﬁrm with
low earnings quality trades at a premium compared with a ﬁrm with high earnings quality. The differential market value
between low and high earnings quality ﬁrms is the value of the information that is not conveyed to the market through the
accounting disclosure, or, in other words, it is the value of the accounting information. 
Investment in local equity is not only driven by superior information on local ﬁrms (e.g., Coval and Moskowitz, 2001;
Ivkovi ´c and Weisbenner, 2005 ), but is also enhanced by the familiarity investors feel towards nearby companies (e.g.,
Grinblatt and Keloharju, 20 01; Huberman, 20 01 ), and our results might be affected by this behaviour. Within low and high
earnings quality ﬁrms, we overcome this issue by further distinguishing under- from over-performing stocks (e.g., stocks
with positive Jensen’s alpha in the next 3 years). In line with the literature (e.g., Korniotis and Kumar, 2013a ), we assume
that investors with superior information are able to distinguish local under- from local over-performing stocks and pursue
long positions only on local over-performing stocks (ignoring local under-performing stocks). On the other hand, when in-
vestors show a preference for local stocks based on feelings of familiarity with nearby ﬁrms, they are expected to be equally
attracted to both under- and over-performing local stocks. In this case, over-performing ﬁrms are predicted to trade at a
premium compared with under-performing ﬁrms and the difference in market values tells us to what extent the investor
preference for local stocks is indeed driven by superior information. To the extent that the empirical patterns of high and
low earning quality ﬁrms are unchanged across under- and over-performing stocks, our results are not affected. 
To test our conjectures we analysed the Italian ﬁrms listed on the Milan Stock Exchange (MSE) over the period 1999–
2011. The MSE ranks at the top among informationally opaque ﬁnancial markets (e.g., Bhattacharya et al., 2003; Leuz
et al., 2003 ) and uncertain legality in Italy is widely recognised (e.g. Cumming and Zambelli, 2013; Bigelli and Mengoli,
2011 ) with Leuz et al., (2003) classifying Italy fourth out of 31 countries for earnings management. Although Consob (the
Italian equivalent of US SEC) has improved disclosure requirements for ﬁrms listed on the MSE (e.g., segment information
disclosure in compliance to IAS 14) with legislative decree 58/1998 (Consolidated Law on Finance), the regulations give no
details about how or what quantity of information should be disclosed. There is no clear sanction for companies that do not
comply and as a result, disclosure by Italian ﬁrms is limited due to disclosure-related costs and the risk of providing use-
ful information to competitors ( Prencipe, 2004 ). Therefore, Italy represents an ideal research setting for investigating value
implications of ﬁrm compliance with accounting principles ( Mengoli et al., 2009; Pazzaglia et al., 2013 ). 
In line with the literature (e.g. Hong et al., 2008 ), we ﬁnd that corporate market values increase the more the issuing
ﬁrm is isolated from the other listed ﬁrms. Furthermore, we ﬁnd over-performing ﬁrms trade at a premium compared with
under-performing ﬁrms, and the wedge between the market values increases with the extra-performance period. Overall
this evidence is consistent with local investor superior information on local stocks. When low vs. high earnings quality
ﬁrms are investigated, results are as expected. We use a wide range of market- and accounting-based measures to proxy
for ﬁrm earnings quality: in all cases the more the ﬁrm is isolated from the other listed ﬁrms, the more the ﬁrm with
low earnings quality trades at a premium compared to the ﬁrm with high earnings quality. In addition, the market value
of low earnings quality ﬁrms is larger for over-performing than for under-performing ﬁrms, and increases with the extra-1 For instance, in Bertinetti and Mantovani (2012) the information risk originates from the timing of the information spreading in the market, the errors 
in the information, and the ways the information is transmitted to the market. Huang and Cheng (2013) deﬁne the information risk as the ambiguity of 
the information possessed by market participants. 
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 performance period. This evidence shows local investors proﬁtably exploit the locally available information by investing in
opaque ﬁrms with positive future risk-adjusted performance. The value of the local information drops with the earnings
quality and accounts for approximately 30% of the market-to-book: remarkably, this represents the value of the information
not conveyed to the market through the accounting disclosure. 
We ﬁrst add to the literature on the relation between the quality of reporting and capital market consequences. In fact,
we show that compliance with accounting principles matters. Yet, while extant literature shows either the existence of a
positive relation (e.g., Francis et al., 2005 ) or the lack of a relation (e.g., Core et al., 2008 ) between accruals quality and
corporate market valuation, we ﬁnd a negative relation between earnings quality and investor trading pattern when taking
a local perspective of analysis. Our results suggest investors evaluate the earnings quality according to their location and this
has pricing implications. In fact, the quality of accounting information seems to be irrelevant when local investors evaluate
stocks. On the other hand, the ﬁrm earnings quality matters in order to deﬁne the value of the information advantage local
investors have compared to the rest of the market. Ultimately, the proportion of local vs. non-local investors deﬁnes the
effect of earnings quality on market values. 
Differently from previous research, we focus on compliance value implications consistent with active investors exploiting
the local information advantage available to them. As such, we add a new perspective to the literature addressing the value
of ﬁrm disclosure in attracting investors and signalling the ﬁrm’s quality to the market (e.g., Al Jifri and Citron, 2009 ). Yet,
unlike previous studies, our results suggest ﬁrms might voluntarily decide not to face the costs of full information disclosure
due to the value enhancing effect of local investor trading, based on recognition of the ﬁrm’s fair value. 
Overall, our results show that ﬁrm opacity leverages the bias of investors to invest locally. This evidence is consistent with
recent behavioural models (e.g., Daniel et al., 1998, 20 01; Hirshleifer, 20 01 ) and previous evidence (e.g., Kumar, 2009 ) of a
positive bias-uncertainty relation. For instance, Kumar (2009) documents that ‘ during times of greater market-level uncertainty,
investors exhibit a stronger preference for familiar stocks and tilt their portfolios more toward domestic and local stocks ’ (p. 1377).
Our ﬁndings are related to this strand of literature showing a positive relation between the Local Home Bias and the level
of uncertainty; unlike other studies, we address this relationship at the ﬁrm-level rather than at market-level. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 illustrates the sample and the methodology. Section
3 investigates the over- and under-performing ﬁrms. Section 4 presents evidence on low and high earnings quality ﬁrms.
Section 5 concludes. 
2. Methodology 
2.1. Data and sample selection 
We investigated several data sources: (i) the databases provided by Consob (i.e., the equivalent of US SEC) for our sample;
(ii) Osiris (Bureau Van Dijk database) and company annual reports for data on ﬁrm location; (iii) the archives provided by
Borsa Italiana S.p.A. (the MSE’s managing company) for information on securities listings; (iv) the electronic archive of the
ﬁnancial newspaper Il Sole 24Ore for press coverage; (v) the investment guide Il Calepino dell’ Azionista for ﬁrm age; (vi) the
databases of ISTAT (Italian Institute of Statistics) and Centro Studi Unioncamere (the research centre of regional Chambers of
Commerce) for information on wealth distribution; and (vii) Datastream and Worldscope (Thompson Financial) for all other
accounting and ﬁnancial information. Finally, Google Maps allowed us to collect the geographic coordinates (i.e., latitude
and longitude) of each sampled ﬁrm headquarters. 
Our initial sample consists of 3020 ﬁrm-year observations for ﬁrms issuing common stock on the MSE over the pe-
riod 1999–2011. From the initial sample, we exclude observations (i) of non actively traded stocks, (ii) with ROE out of a
range of plus one and minus one, (iii) not headquartered in Italy, and (iv) on ﬁnancial ﬁrms (SIC 60 0 0–6999). The resulting
unbalanced panel data set consists of 2240 ﬁrm-year observations and is our ﬁnal sample. 
2.2. Methodology and variables deﬁnition 
The logarithmic transformation of the market-to-book ratio ( LN(MARKET-TO-BOOK) ) is our left-hand side variable, while
we proxy the level of ﬁrm isolation and hence the ﬁrm Local Home Bias through the variable I_FIRM ( Baschieri et al., 2015 ).
I_FIRM is the Johnson and Zimmer (1985) spatial dispersion index: it is based on point-to-point individual distances and
computed for every ﬁrm-year observation on the spatial distribution of all other listed ﬁrms. The expected value of I_FIRM
is approximately two: values lower than two reveal a low concentration of listed ﬁrms around the ﬁrm headquarters, while
values higher than two indicate a higher concentration of listed ﬁrms around the ﬁrm headquarters. Therefore, a low value
of I_FIRM represents isolated ﬁrms and indicates high Local Home Bias. Consistent with previous evidence, we expect the
MARKET-TO-BOOK to be negatively affected by I_FIRM : the magnitude of this relation is the Local Home Bias effect, that is
the portion of corporate market value related to the investor preference for local equity. As a robustness check, we re-run
our analysis using the Hong et al., (2008) ’ RATIO variable as proxy for the Local Home Bias, with unchanged results (not
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 reported). 2 Finally, as in Baschieri et al., (2015) and Hong et al., (2008) , when we run our regressions we exclude ﬁnancial
ﬁrms, yet keep these observations when computing I_FIRM and RATIO . 
We distinguish future risk-adjusted under- and over-performing ﬁrms. Firm risk-adjusted extra-performance is estimated
by Jensen’s alpha ( Jensen, 1968 ) from an expanded index model regression ( ALPHA ), and upon a minimum of 6 months
of weekly observations ( Hutton et al., 2009 ). Over-performing ﬁrms are ﬁrms with positive ALPHA , while under-performing
ﬁrms are ﬁrms with negative ALPHA ( ALPHA + vs. ALPHA −). We consider three progressively stronger and nested deﬁnitions
of future over- and under-performing ﬁrms. In particular, we introduce three interacting dummy variables detecting ﬁrms
with positive (negative) ALPHA in the prospective year only ( 1yALPHA + vs. 1yALPHA −), in both the next 2 years ( 2yALPHA +
vs. 2yALPHA −), and in each of the next 3 years ( 3yALPHA + vs. 3yALPHA −). We expect the isolated ALPHA + ﬁrms to trade at a
premium compared with isolated ALPHA − ﬁrms, and the magnitude of this relation increases with the Local Home Bias. In
addition we predict this effect to increase as the over-performing period continues, i.e. shifting from 1yALPHA + to 3yALPHA + .
We further distinguish low and high earnings quality ﬁrms. The literature provides a wide range of measures for earnings
quality (EQ), and the selection of the most appropriate is deﬁnitely not trivial (e.g., Dechow et al., 2010; Ecker et al., 2013 ).
Yet, lack of transparency is associated with higher R 2 s, indicating little revelation of ﬁrm-speciﬁc information (e.g., Hutton
et al., 2009; Jin and Myers, 2006 ). Consistent with measurement issues, we implement several alternative proxies for EQ.
We use three market-based measures of EQ: (i) the negative skewness of beta-adjusted weekly residual returns divided by
the cubed standard deviation ( EQ1 MARKET ) (e.g., Chen et al., 2001; Jin and Myers, 2006 ); (ii) the difference of downside
frequencies and upside frequencies of the ﬁrm-speciﬁc weekly residual returns exceeding k standard deviations above and
below the mean, with k chosen to generate frequencies of 0.01% in the normal distribution ( EQ2 MARKET ) (e.g., Hutton et al.,
2009; Jin and Myers, 2006 ); and (iii) the idiosyncratic risk or ﬁrm-speciﬁc volatility as deﬁned by the logistic transformation
of R 2 ( EQ3 MARKET ) (e.g., Hutton et al., 2009; Morck et al., 20 0 0 ). We also proxy EQ from accounting data using discretionary
accruals (e.g., Christensen et al., 2013 ). We estimate discretionary accruals according to Dechow et al., (1995) ( DISC ACC ). We
then proxy EQ with: (iv) the absolute value of DISC ACC ( EQ1 ACCOUNTING ) (e.g., Dechow et al., 1995 ), and v) the 3 years
moving sum of EQ1 ACCOUNTING ( EQ2 ACCOUNTING ) (e.g., Hutton et al., 2009 ). 3 All measures are inversely related to EQ as,
for instance, an increase in EQ1 MARKET means the stock is more “crash prone”. Therefore, high earnings quality ﬁrms are
ﬁrms with EQ below the cross-sectional median, and low earnings quality ﬁrms are ﬁrms with EQ above the cross-sectional
median ( HIGH EQ vs. LOW EQ ). We expect to see a direct relationship between an increase in ﬁrm isolation and the LOW EQ
ﬁrms trading at a premium compared to HIGH EQ ﬁrms. 
In the multivariate analysis, we include a wide range of control variables. In particular we control for (with predictions):
( + ) local investor risk-tolerance ( I_INCOME ). I_INCOME is the Johnson and Zimmer (1985) spatial dispersion index com-
puted for every ﬁrm-year observation on the spatial distribution of household disposable income. A high value of
I_INCOME indicates a higher concentration of investor wealth around the ﬁrm headquarters. As in Aabo et al., (2013),
Baschieri et al., (2015) , and Hong et al., (2008) , we assume local investor risk-tolerance proportional to the local
wealth, and predict a positive relation between MARKET-TO-BOOK and I_INCOME ; 
( + ) current equity proﬁtability ( ROE ): more proﬁtable ﬁrms are expected to beneﬁt from a higher market valuation, and
a positive relation between ROE and MARKET-TO-BOOK is predicted (e.g., Bagella et al., 20 0 0 ); 
( + ) ﬁrm future growth opportunities ( R&D-TO-SALES ): superior growth prospects drive higher stock prices, and a positive
relation with MARKET-TO-BOOK is expected (e.g., Hall and Oriani, 2006 ); 
(–) ﬁrm size, deﬁned by total asset ( LN(1 + FIRM SIZE )): small ﬁrms are characterized by larger information asymmetries
than large ﬁrms, and a negative relation with MARKET-TO-BOOK is predicted (e.g., van Dijk, 2011 ); 
(–) ﬁrm age, deﬁned by the number of years of a ﬁrm’s life since foundation ( LN(1 + FIRM AGE) ): less information is usually
available for younger ﬁrms which are therefore riskier than older ﬁrms, and a negative relation with MARKET-TO-BOOK
is expected (e.g., Keloharju and Kulp, 1996 ); 
( + ) ﬁrm press coverage, deﬁned by the yearly number of newspaper articles reporting the ﬁrm name ( LN(1 + PRESS COV-
ERAGE) ). High media coverage is expected to disclose valuable information about the ﬁrm, and a positive relation with
MARKET-TO-BOOK is predicted (e.g., Birz and Lott, 2011 ). 
In addition, we include in all regressions (not shown) a dummy variable which equals one if the company does not report
R&D expenditure ( R&D ) and zero otherwise ( Chan et al., 2001 ), a set of four-digit SIC industry dummies, a set of exchange
segment listing dummies, and a set of year dummies. Finally, we control for any possible cross-sectional and time-series
correlation by clustering standard errors both at ﬁrm- and year-level, consistent with Petersen (2009) . 
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for sampled ﬁrms, while Table A.1 in the Appendix provides detailed deﬁnitions of
the variables here employed. 2 Hong et al. (2008)’s key variable is the ratio ( RATIO ) of the equity book value of all listed ﬁrms headquartered within the same Census region (i.e. the 
local supply of stocks) and the disposable income of all households living in the region (i.e. the local demand for stocks). 
3 For robustness purposes we re-run our analysis using alternative deﬁnitions both for discretionary accruals and EQ. In particular, we also estimate 
discretionary accruals according to the method used in Ashbaugh et al. (2003) ( REDCA ) and we further deﬁne EQ with: vi-viii) the 3(5)(7) years moving 
standard deviation of REDCA ( EQ3(4)(5) ACCOUNTING ) (e.g., Chaney et al., 2011 ), and ix-x) the R 2 (Adjusted R 2 ) from the expanded index model regression of 
weekly returns ( R-SQUARED and ADJUSTED R-SQUARED ) (e.g., Hutton et al., 2009; Jin and Myers, 2006 ). In all the cases, results (not reported) are unchanged. 
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Table 1 
Summary statistics. 
Mean Median 25-tile 75-tile 
Firm characteristic 
MARKET-TO-BOOK 2 .28 1 .65 1 .14 2 .52 
I_FIRM 2 .93 3 .09 1 .72 3 .86 
I_INCOME 2 .06 2 .18 1 .90 2 .27 
ROE 5 .05% 7 .44% 1 .07% 13 .46% 
R&D-TO-SALES 0 .49% 0 .00% 0 .00% 0 .00% 
FIRM SIZE 11 ,433 507 169 3617 
FIRM AGE 48 29 14 78 
PRESS COVERAGE 32 14 8 27 
Firm over-performance 
ALPHA 0 .12% 0 .07% −0 .27% 0 .44% 
1yALPHA + 0 .56 1 .00 0 .00 1 .00 
2yALPHA + 0 .34 0 .00 0 .00 1 .00 
3yALPHA + 0 .21 0 .00 0 .00 0 .00 
Firm earnings quality 
EQ1 MARKET −15 ,347 −5935 −19 ,539 747 
EQ2 MARKET −0 .25 0 .00 −1 .00 0 .00 
EQ3 MARKET 1 .33 1 .25 0 .57 1 .99 
EQ1 ACCOUNTING 0 .07 0 .04 0 .02 0 .08 
EQ2 ACCOUNTING 0 .21 0 .15 0 .09 0 .25 
This table reports the summary statistics on ﬁrm characteristics. The sam- 
ple consists of 2240 observations on Italian nonﬁnancial ﬁrms traded on 
the MSE over the period 1999–2011. All variables are deﬁned as in the ap- 
pendix. 
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 3. Firm over-performance and the Local Home Bias 
In this section, we test the signiﬁcance of the relations between LN(MARKET-TO-BOOK) and I_FIRM across future risk-
adjusted over- ( ALPHA + ) and under-performing ( ALPHA −) ﬁrms. We expect a negative relation between I_FIRM and MARKET-
O-BOOK . In addition, we predict this effect to be larger in future over-performing than in under-performing ﬁrms (i.e., β1 
< β2 ). Finally, we expect the effect of I_FIRM to increase shifting from ﬁrms with positive ALPHA in the prospective year
only ( 1yALPHA + ) to ﬁrms over-performing in each of the next 3 years ( 3yALPHA + ). Table 2 shows the results. 
As expected, the effect of I_FIRM on LN(MARKET-TO-BOOK) is negative and signiﬁcant (Model 1: β1 = –0.087, p -
value < 0.05). When we distinguish over- and under-performing ﬁrms, results are as predicted. In fact, the relation between
I_FIRM and MARKET-TO-BOOK remains negative and statistically signiﬁcant. Furthermore, the effect of I_FIRM is stronger
both in magnitude and in statistical signiﬁcance in over- than in under-performing ﬁrms (e.g., Model 4: β1 = –0.143, p -
value < 0.01; β2 = –0.074, p -value < 0.10; F- Test β1 = β2 = 2.88, p -value < 0.10), meaning that, the more the ﬁrm is isolated, the
more a ﬁrm with a positive future risk-adjusted performance trades at a premium compared to a future under-performing
ﬁrm. Looking at the number of years the ﬁrm over-performs, as predicted the relation between I_FIRM and MARKET-TO-
BOOK is stronger the longer the future over-performing period is, that is shifting from 1yALPHA + (Model 2) to 3yALPHA + 
(Model 4). For instance, the effect of I_FIRM in ﬁrms with positive ALPHA in each of the next 3 years is 52% higher than in
ﬁrms over-performing in the prospective year only. In addition, the dummy variables detecting over-performing ﬁrms (i.e.,
1yALPHA + , 2yALPHA + and 3yALPHA + ) are not signiﬁcant in explaining the MARKET-TO-BOOK , suggesting non-local investors
fail in detecting ﬁrms with positive ALPHA . Finally, the pattern of the control variables is as expected. 
Our results suggest that the preference for local stocks is related to the information advantage investors possess about lo-
cal ﬁrms: investors pick local isolated over-performing ﬁrms which eventually trade at a premium compared to local isolated
under-performing ﬁrms. As further evidence, the difference in market values between isolated over- and under-performing
ﬁrms increases with the over-performing period, that is when the local information advantage is more substantial and valu-
able. Yet, although lower in magnitude, the Local Home Bias effect detected in isolated under-performing ﬁrms support that
even a behavioural component of investor preference for local stocks is in play. Economically, a measure of local investor in-
formation advantage can be inferred by considering the average sampled over-performing ﬁrm, for which MARKET-TO-BOOK
is 1.65, I_FIRM is 3.09 and 3yALPHA + is 1. Our ﬁndings imply that, all other things being equal, 0.94 of MARKET-TO-BOOK is
attributable to I_FIRM . In fact, 0.442 (0.442 = 0.143 ×3.09) is the estimated LN(MARKET-TO-BOOK) attributable to I_FIRM , and
1.556 (1.556 = e (0.442) ), is the corresponding estimated MARKET-TO-BOOK , which is 0.94 (0.9428 = 1.556/1.65) of MARKET-
O-BOOK . The same estimate for the average sampled under-performing ﬁrm ( 3yALPHA − =1) is about 0.76, meaning that
the MARKET-TO-BOOK of isolated ﬁrms over-performing in each of the next 3 years is 18% higher than the MARKET-TO-
BOOK of isolated ﬁrms with negative Jensen’s alphas in the same period. This difference in value is entirely attributable
to the superior information local investors possess about nearby ﬁrms. Similar but smoothed dynamics hold for ﬁrms
over-(under-)performing in the next 2 and 1 years. 
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Table 2 
The Local Home Bias and the ﬁrm over-performance. 
Dependent variable LN(MARKET-TO-BOOK) 
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant 0 .443 0 .458 0 .451 0 .415 
(0 .99) (1 .05) (1 .03) (0 .94) 
I_FIRM −0 .087 ∗∗
(−2 .08) 
I_FIRM ∗1yALPHA + β1 −0 .094 ∗∗
(−2 .26) 
I_FIRM ∗1yALPHA − β2 −0 .085 ∗
(−1 .89) 
1yALPHA + −0 .100 
(−1 .19) 
I_FIRM ∗2yALPHA + β1 −0 .105 ∗∗
(−2 .38) 
I_FIRM ∗2yALPHA − β2 −0 .083 ∗
(−1 .84) 
2yALPHA + −0 .052 
(−0 .44) 
I_FIRM ∗3yALPHA + β1 −0 .143 ∗∗∗
(−3 .01) 
I_FIRM ∗3yALPHA − β2 −0 .074 ∗
(−1 .69) 
3yALPHA + 0 .066 
(0 .47) 
I_INCOME 0 .420 ∗∗∗ 0 .430 ∗∗∗ 0 .423 ∗∗∗ 0 .419 ∗∗∗
(2 .62) (2 .68) (2 .61) (2 .59) 
ROE 0 .373 ∗ 0 .421 ∗∗ 0 .403 ∗∗ 0 .399 ∗∗
(1 .82) (2 .21) (2 .02) (1 .98) 
R&D-TO-SALES 1 .725 1 .798 1 .701 1 .594 
(1 .34) (1 .41) (1 .34) (1 .23) 
LN(1 + FIRM SIZE) −0 .074 ∗∗ −0 .074 ∗∗ −0 .073 ∗∗ −0 .072 ∗∗
(−2 .18) (−2 .24) (−2 .23) (−2 .19) 
LN(1 + FIRM AGE) −0 .102 ∗∗∗ −0 .100 ∗∗∗ −0 .100 ∗∗∗ −0 .099 ∗∗∗
(−3 .66) (−3 .56) (−3 .53) (−3 .52) 
LN(1 + PRESS COVERAGE) 0 .255 ∗∗∗ 0 .253 ∗∗∗ 0 .253 ∗∗∗ 0 .251 ∗∗∗
(5 .37) (5 .32) (5 .40) (5 .20) 
Dummy industry YES YES YES YES 
Dummy exchange segment YES YES YES YES 
Dummy year YES YES YES YES 
Number of observations 1303 1303 1303 1303 
R 2 – adjusted 0 .426 0 .434 0 .432 0 .434 
This table reports the results of the multivariate analysis of relations between LN(MARKET-TO-BOOK) and I_FIRM controlling for ﬁrm over-performance. 
The sample consists of 2240 observations on Italian nonﬁnancial ﬁrms traded on the MSE over the period 1999–2011. All variables are deﬁned as in 
the appendix. t-statistics based on standard errors clustered by ﬁrm and year are reported in parenthesis. ∗∗∗ , ∗∗ , and ∗ indicate statistical signiﬁcance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 4. Firm earnings quality and the Local Home Bias 
In this section, we test the signiﬁcance of the relations between LN(MARKET-TO-BOOK) and I_FIRM across low and high
earnings quality ﬁrms ( LOW EQ vs. HIGH EQ ). We expect the relation of I_FIRM with MARKET-TO-BOOK to be negative, and
higher in over- rather than in under-performing ﬁrms (i.e., γ 1 < γ 3 ; γ 2 < γ 4 ). In addition, we predict the effect of I_FIRM
to be higher in LOW EQ than in HIGH EQ (i.e., γ 1 < γ 2 ; γ 3 < γ 4 ), and the discrepancy of the effects to increase with ﬁrm
over-performance, i.e. shifting from 1yALPHA + to 3yALPHA + . Table 3 reports the results when market measures of EQ are
considered: models 1–3 are with EQ1 MARKET , models 4–6 are with EQ2 MARKET, while models 7–9 use EQ3 MARKET . 
In all models and for all measures of EQ, the relation between I_FIRM and MARKET-TO-BOOK is negative and, in most
cases, statistically signiﬁcant. Consistent with previous ﬁndings (cf. Table 2 ), the effect of I_FIRM on MARKET-TO-BOOK is
always higher in over- rather than in under-performing ﬁrms (e.g., model 6: γ 1 = –0.232, p -value < 0.01; γ 3 = –0.183, p-
value < 0.01; F -Test γ 1 = γ 3 = 5.97, p- value < 0.05). In addition, the effect of I_FIRM is higher in LOW EQ than in HIGH EQ ﬁrms
(e.g., model 6, 3yALPHA + = 1: γ 1 = –0.232, p- value < 0.01; γ 2 = –0.147, p- value < 0.01; F -Test γ 1 = γ 2 = 7.98, p -value < 0.01;
3yALPHA − = 1: γ 3 = –0.183, p -value < 0.01; γ 4 = –0.069, p- value > 0.10; F -Test γ 3 = γ 4 = 11.22, p -value < 0.01), meaning that,
the more the issuing ﬁrm is isolated from the other listed ﬁrms, the more the opaque ﬁrm trades at a premium compared
to the ﬁrm which is fully compliant with accounting principles. As predicted, the difference in market values in LOW EQ
and HIGH EQ ﬁrms increases with ﬁrm future proﬁtability. For instance, when EQ is measured through EQ2 MARKET , the
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Table 3 
The Local Home Bias and the earnings quality using market measures. 
Dependent variable LN(MARKET-TO-BOOK) 
MARKET EQ proxy EQ1 EQ2 EQ3 
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Constant 0 .312 0 .314 0 .278 0 .325 0 .322 0 .301 0 .327 0 .349 0 .330 
(0 .72) (0 .73) (0 .64) (0 .72) (0 .71) (0 .67) (0 .69) (0 .74) (0 .70) 
I_FIRM ∗1yALPHA + ∗LOW EQ γ 1 −0 .113 ∗∗ −0 .208 ∗∗∗ −0 .126 ∗∗
(−2 .12) (−5 .24) (−2 .50) 
I_FIRM ∗1yALPHA + ∗HIGH EQ γ 2 −0 .090 ∗ −0 .093 ∗∗ −0 .094 ∗
(−1 .86) (−2 .00) (−1 .86) 
I_FIRM ∗1yALPHA −∗LOW EQ γ 3 −0 .089 −0 .174 ∗∗∗ −0 .098 ∗
(−1 .48) (−3 .03) (−1 .96) 
I_FIRM ∗1yALPHA −∗HIGH EQ γ 4 −0 .078 −0 .078 −0 .067 
(−1 .17) (−1 .16) (−1 .14) 
1yALPHA + −0 .071 −0 .071 −0 .030 
(−0 .71) (−0 .71) (−0 .28) 
I_FIRM ∗2yALPHA + ∗LOW EQ γ 1 −0 .125 ∗∗ −0 .197 ∗∗∗ −0 .135 ∗∗
(−2 .18) (−3 .87) (−2 .39) 
I_FIRM ∗2yALPHA + ∗HIGH EQ γ 2 −0 .106 ∗∗ −0 .109 ∗∗ −0 .112 ∗∗
(−2 .09) (−2 .20) (−2 .19) 
I_FIRM ∗2yALPHA −∗LOW EQ γ 3 −0 .090 −0 .200 ∗∗∗ −0 .106 ∗∗
(−1 .56) (−3 .78) (−2 .13) 
I_FIRM ∗2yALPHA −∗HIGH EQ γ 4 −0 .073 −0 .077 −0 .061 
(−1 .51) (−1 .61) (−1 .08) 
2yALPHA + −0 .019 −0 .034 0 .009 
(−0 .14) (−0 .25) (0 .06) 
I_FIRM ∗3yALPHA + ∗LOW EQ γ 1 −0 .162 ∗∗∗ −0 .232 ∗∗∗ −0 .161 ∗∗∗
(−2 .79) (−4 .12) (−2 .72) 
I_FIRM ∗3yALPHA + ∗HIGH EQ γ 2 −0 .142 ∗∗ −0 .147 ∗∗∗ −0 .145 ∗∗∗
(−2 .53) (−2 .77) (−2 .80) 
I_FIRM ∗3yALPHA −∗LOW EQ γ 3 −0 .085 −0 .183 ∗∗∗ −0 .102 ∗∗
(−1 .49) (−4 .01) (−2 .12) 
I_FIRM ∗3yALPHA −∗HIGH EQ γ 4 −0 .065 −0 .069 −0 .055 
(−1 .37) (−1 .47) (−1 .00) 
3yALPHA + 0 .072 0 .073 0 .083 
(0 .44) (0 .45) (0 .53) 
LOW EQ −0 .111 −0 .107 −0 .117 −0 .126 −0 .133 −0 .127 −0 .081 −0 .091 −0 .098 
(−0 .71) (−0 .69) (−0 .75) (−0 .77) (−0 .86) (−0 .78) (−0 .80) (−0 .96) (−0 .97) 
I_INCOME 0 .439 ∗∗∗ 0 .429 ∗∗ 0 .426 ∗∗ 0 .4 4 4 ∗∗∗ 0 .438 ∗∗∗ 0 .432 ∗∗ 0 .420 ∗∗ 0 .407 ∗∗ 0 .404 ∗∗
(2 .60) (2 .52) (2 .50) (2 .66) (2 .60) (2 .56) (2 .38) (2 .29) (2 .27) 
ROE 0 .361 ∗∗ 0 .343 ∗ 0 .339 ∗ 0 .350 ∗∗ 0 .335 ∗∗ 0 .332 ∗ 0 .356 ∗ 0 .346 ∗ 0 .338 ∗
(2 .11) (1 .94) (1 .89) (2 .15) (1 .97) (1 .94) (1 .89) (1 .78) (1 .73) 
R&D-TO-SALES 1 .895 1 .866 1 .754 1 .749 1 .714 1 .612 1 .446 1 .355 1 .254 
(1 .46) (1 .47) (1 .38) (1 .33) (1 .36) (1 .27) (1 .02) (0 .98) (0 .92) 
LN(1 + FIRM SIZE) −0 .068 ∗∗ −0 .067 ∗∗ −0 .066 ∗∗ −0 .068 ∗∗ −0 .066 ∗∗ −0 .066 ∗∗ −0 .067 ∗ −0 .067 ∗ −0 .067 ∗
(−2 .04) (−2 .05) (−2 .02) (−2 .02) (−2 .01) (−2 .02) (−1 .89) (−1 .93) (−1 .91) 
LN(1 + FIRM AGE) −0 .101 ∗∗∗ −0 .100 ∗∗∗ −0 .098 ∗∗∗ −0 .099 ∗∗∗ −0 .098 ∗∗∗ −0 .097 ∗∗∗ −0 .099 ∗∗∗ −0 .098 ∗∗∗ −0 .097 ∗∗∗
(−3 .32) (−3 .28) (−3 .26) (−3 .22) (−3 .18) (−3 .17) (−2 .81) (−2 .73) (−2 .75) 
LN(1 + PRESS COVERAGE) 0 .253 ∗∗∗ 0 .253 ∗∗∗ 0 .251 ∗∗∗ 0 .257 ∗∗∗ 0 .256 ∗∗∗ 0 .255 ∗∗∗ 0 .262 ∗∗∗ 0 .261 ∗∗∗ 0 .260 ∗∗∗
(4 .67) (4 .73) (4 .62) (4 .74) (4 .77) (4 .68) (4 .66) (4 .72) (4 .62) 
Dummy industry YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Dummy exchange segment YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Dummy year YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Number of observations 1229 1229 1229 1229 1229 1229 1145 1145 1145 
R 2 – adjusted 0 .430 0 .428 0 .431 0 .430 0 .429 0 .432 0 .427 0 .427 0 .430 
This table reports the results of the multivariate analysis of relations between LN(MARKET-TO-BOOK) and I_FIRM controlling for ﬁrm over-performance and 
EQ. The sample consists of 2240 observations on Italian nonﬁnancial ﬁrms traded on the MSE over the period 1999–2011. All variables are deﬁned as in 
the appendix. t-statistics based on standard errors clustered by ﬁrm and year are reported in parenthesis. ∗∗∗ , ∗∗ , and ∗ indicate statistical signiﬁcance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 effect of I_FIRM in LOW EQ ﬁrms with positive ALPHA in each of the next 3 years is about 12% higher than in LOW EQ ﬁrms
over-performing in the prospective year only. When EQ1 MARKET or EQ3 MARKET are used for EQ, the differential effect for
opaque ﬁrms rises up to 43% and 28%, respectively. 
Table 4 reports results when discretionary accruals are used to proxy EQ: models 1–3 are with EQ1 ACCOUNTING , while
models 4–6 use EQ2 ACCOUNTING . 
When EQ is measured through EQ2 ACCOUNTING , results are generally comparable to the previous ones even though some
differences can be detected. In fact, the relation between I_FIRM and MARKET-TO-BOOK is negative and statistically signiﬁcant
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Table 4 
The Local Home Bias and the earnings quality using discretionary accruals. 
Dependent variable LN(MARKET-TO-BOOK) 
ACCOUNTING EQ proxy EQ1 EQ2 
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Constant 0 .587 0 .592 0 .569 0 .357 0 .305 0 .300 
(1 .02) (1 .02) (1 .00) (0 .51) (0 .43) (0 .43) 
I_FIRM ∗1yALPHA + ∗LOW EQ γ 1 −0 .104 ∗ −0 .159 ∗∗
(−1 .88) (−2 .31) 
I_FIRM ∗1yALPHA + ∗HIGH EQ γ 2 −0 .084 −0 .066 
(−1 .37) (−1 .11) 
I_FIRM ∗1yALPHA −∗LOW EQ γ 3 −0 .096 −0 .135 ∗∗
(−1 .42) (−2 .49) 
I_FIRM ∗1yALPHA −∗HIGH EQ γ 4 −0 .088 −0 .071 
(−1 .52) (−1 .14) 
1yALPHA + −0 .111 −0 .116 
(−0 .85) (−0 .65) 
I_FIRM ∗2yALPHA + ∗LOW EQ γ 1 −0 .109 ∗ −0 .167 ∗∗∗
(−1 .76) (−2 .87) 
I_FIRM ∗2yALPHA + ∗HIGH EQ γ 2 −0 .076 −0 .071 
(−1 .17) (−1 .09) 
I_FIRM ∗2yALPHA −∗LOW EQ γ 3 −0 .075 −0 .126 ∗∗
(−1 .16) (−2 .04) 
I_FIRM ∗2yALPHA −∗HIGH EQ γ 4 −0 .086 −0 .070 
(−1 .48) (−1 .16) 
2yALPHA + −0 .170 −0 .125 
(−1 .09) (−0 .56) 
I_FIRM ∗3yALPHA + ∗LOW EQ γ 1 −0 .107 −0 .178 ∗∗∗
(−1 .53) (−2 .85) 
I_FIRM ∗3yALPHA + ∗HIGH EQ γ 2 −0 .110 −0 .110 ∗
(−1 .62) (−1 .73) 
I_FIRM ∗3yALPHA −∗LOW EQ γ 3 −0 .094 −0 .153 ∗∗∗
(−1 .52) (−2 .84) 
I_FIRM ∗3yALPHA −∗HIGH EQ γ 4 −0 .075 −0 .059 
(−1 .29) (−0 .98) 
3yALPHA + −0 .039 −0 .013 
(−0 .22) (−0 .05) 
LOW EQ −0 .022 −0 .022 −0 .026 −0 .110 −0 .101 −0 .104 
(−0 .22) (−0 .22) (−0 .26) (−1 .14) (−1 .00) (−1 .09) 
I_INCOME 0 .316 ∗ 0 .301 0 .295 0 .385 ∗∗ 0 .382 ∗∗ 0 .372 ∗∗
(1 .72) (1 .63) (1 .58) (2 .08) (2 .08) (1 .99) 
ROE 0 .196 0 .188 0 .176 0 .169 0 .163 0 .146 
(1 .04) (0 .97) (0 .90) (0 .88) (0 .85) (0 .76) 
R&D-TO-SALES 1 .729 1 .704 1 .613 2 .083 2 .093 2 .029 
(1 .06) (1 .10) (1 .04) (1 .20) (1 .24) (1 .19) 
LN(1 + FIRM SIZE) −0 .070 ∗ −0 .069 ∗ −0 .070 ∗ −0 .070 −0 .065 −0 .068 
(−1 .74) (−1 .71) (−1 .73) (−1 .53) (−1 .37) (−1 .49) 
LN(1 + FIRM AGE) −0 .076 ∗∗ −0 .074 ∗∗ −0 .075 ∗∗ −0 .079 ∗∗ −0 .079 ∗∗ −0 .079 ∗∗
(−2 .07) (−2 .00) (−1 .97) (−2 .41) (−2 .37) (−2 .32) 
LN(1 + PRESS COVERAGE) 0 .243 ∗∗∗ 0 .246 ∗∗∗ 0 .244 ∗∗∗ 0 .272 ∗∗∗ 0 .270 ∗∗∗ 0 .271 ∗∗∗
(3 .65) (3 .70) (3 .60) (3 .58) (3 .57) (3 .54) 
Dummy industry YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Dummy exchange segment YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Dummy year YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Number of observations 725 725 725 565 565 565 
R 2 – adjusted 0 .419 0 .42 0 .417 0 .42 0 .421 0 .421 
This table reports the results of the multivariate analysis of relations between LN(MARKET-TO-BOOK) and I_FIRM controlling 
for ﬁrm over-performance and EQ. The sample consists of 2240 observations on Italian nonﬁnancial ﬁrms traded on the 
MSE over the period 1999–2011. All variables are deﬁned as in the appendix. t-statistics based on standard errors clustered 
by ﬁrm and year are reported in parenthesis. ∗∗∗ , ∗∗ , and ∗ indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 in LOW EQ ﬁrms. Yet, this relation is almost never signiﬁcant when HIGH EQ ﬁrms are considered. Most importantly, the
effect of I_FIRM is still higher in LOW EQ than in HIGH EQ ﬁrms (e.g., model 6, 3yALPHA + = 1: γ 1 = –0.178, p -value < 0.01;
γ 2 = –0.110, p -value < 0.10; F- Test γ 1 = γ 2 = 3.61, p -value < 0.05; 3yALPHA − = 1: γ 3 = –0.153, p -value < 0.01; γ 4 = –0.059, p -
value > 0.10; F -Test γ 3 = γ 4 = 9.08, p -value < 0.01), and the magnitude of the effect increases with ﬁrm future performance.
On the other hand, when EQ is measured through EQ1 ACCOUNTING , the relation between I_FIRM and MARKET-TO-BOOK is
almost never signiﬁcant. 
154 G. Baschieri et al. / Finance Research Letters 19 (2016) 146–157 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Previous ﬁndings suggest that the ﬁrm EQ affects investor preference for local stocks: poor disclosure increases the value
of the information available just locally, which local investors exploit by investing in stocks with positive future risk-adjusted
performance. Economically, a measure of the value of the information locally available and not conveyed to the market
through the accounting disclosure can be inferred by considering the average sampled over-performing and opaque ﬁrm,
for which MARKET-TO-BOOK is 1.65, I_FIRM is 3.09, 3yALPHA + is 1 and LOW EQ is 1. When EQ is measured by EQ2 MARKET
our ﬁndings imply that, all other things being equal, 1.24 of MARKET-TO-BOOK is attributable to I_FIRM . The same estimate
for the average sampled over-performing but non-opaque ﬁrm ( HIGH EQ = 1) is about 0.95, meaning that the MARKET-TO-
BOOK of opaque and isolated ﬁrms is up to 29% higher than the MARKET-TO-BOOK of isolated ﬁrms with full information
disclosure. This difference in value is entirely attributable to the information that is only available to and therefore exploited
by local investors. 
5. Conclusions 
The investor preference for local stocks provides a quasi-experimental setting to test whether the market rewards ﬁrms
that comply with accounting principles. The Local Home Bias disentangles local from non-local investors and isolates the
locally available information from the publicly available information. Research acknowledges that superior information at a
local level drives the over-investment in local equity, which in turn boosts corporate market values in isolated ﬁrms. We
argue that the value of the information available locally drops with the ﬁrm earnings quality (i.e., with the disclosure of
accounting information). In fact, the lower the ﬁrm earnings quality, the higher the advantage to local investors who then
invest in local stocks with positive future risk-adjusted performance. 
Consistent with our conjecture, we ﬁnd that the more a ﬁrm is isolated from the other listed ﬁrms, the more the over-
performing ﬁrm trades at a premium compared to the under-performing ﬁrm, and this effect becomes stronger as the
over-performance period increases. Furthermore, we ﬁnd the higher the ﬁrm isolation, the more a low earnings quality ﬁrm
trades at a premium compared to a high earnings quality ﬁrm. We employ several different market- and accounting-based
measures to proxy for the ﬁrm earnings quality, such as residual return negative skewness, negative return jumps, idiosyn-
cratic risk, and persistency of discretionary accruals. In all cases, the pattern is unchanged meaning that local investors
effectively exploit the information available at the local level. Remarkably, the value of information not conveyed to the
market through the accounting disclosure is approximately 30% of the market-to-book. 
Our empirical ﬁndings add to the earnings quality, asset-pricing, and Local Home Bias literature. More importantly, the
ﬁnancial and accounting research is enriched by results on the relation between the quality of reporting and capital mar-
ket consequences. In fact, we show that compliance with accounting principles matters. Unlike prior studies supporting the
existence of a positive relation (e.g., Francis et al., 2005 ) or the lack of a relation (e.g., Core et al., 2008 ) between accru-
als quality and corporate market value, we consider the local perspective and ﬁnd a negative relation between earnings
quality and investor trading pattern. Overall, our results depict investors as a group which is heterogeneous in evaluating a
ﬁrm’s earnings quality: while non-local investors are sensitive to the quality of the accounting information, local and better-
informed investors are not. Local investors seek ﬁrms with partial disclosure in order to exploit the superior information
they possess by investing in positive alphas’ local stocks, and the ﬁrm earnings quality deﬁnes the value of the information
advantage local investors have over the rest of the market. We also contribute to the Local Home Bias literature by showing
that the bias of investors to invest locally is leveraged by the ﬁrm opacity. Our ﬁndings are consistent with recent studies
highlighting the increase of investors’ biases and their preference for local equity during periods of higher uncertainty at
market-level (e.g., Kumar, 2009 ). We add to this literature and test this issue considering a different perspective: uncertainty
deﬁned at ﬁrm-level rather than at market-level. Ultimately, our results support and help detect the persistence of investors’
biases also in periods with less market uncertainty, especially toward ﬁrms not compliant with general accounting princi-
ples. Finally, our ﬁndings also provide an original point of view to the literature addressing the value of ﬁrm disclosure as
a signal of ﬁrm quality (e.g., Al Jifri and Citron, 2009 ). In fact, we suggest ﬁrms might voluntarily choose not to improve
reporting quality due to local investor recognition of their fair value and the value enhancing Local Home Bias effect. We
believe there is ample room for future research. 
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Table A.1 
Variable deﬁnitions. 
Variable Description 
1y(2y)(3y)ALPHA + _D Equal to one if the ﬁrm has a positive ALPHA in the next (two)(three) year(s) and zero otherwise 
1y(2y)(3y)ALPHA −_D Equal to one if the ﬁrm has a negative ALPHA in the next (two)(three) year(s) and zero otherwise 
ADJ-R2 The adjusted R 2 computed from the ALPHA equation 
ALPHA Jensen’s alpha ( Jensen, 1968 ), computed from an expanded index model regression and upon a minimum of 6 
months of weekly observations. Formally, we estimate the following equation for ALPHA 
R i,w,t = αi + β1 ,i ∗ R m,w −1 ,t + β2 ,i ∗ R j,w −1 ,t + β3 ,i ∗ R m,w,t + β4 ,i ∗ R j,w,t 
+ β5 ,i ∗ R m,w +1 ,t + β6 ,i ∗ R j,w +1 ,t + ε i,w,t 
where: 
R i,w,t is the stock return of ﬁrm i at week w in year t , αi is Jensen’s alpha, R m,w,t ( R m,w-1,t ) ( R m,w + 1,t ) is the market 
index return at week w ( w – 1) ( w + 1) in year t , R j,w,t ( R j,w-1,t ) ( R j,w + 1,t ) is the Fama and French value-weighted 
industry index at week w ( w – 1) ( w + 1) in year t , and ɛ i,w,t is the error term for R i,w,t 
Source: Datastream (datatype: RI) 
ALPHA + _D Equal to one if the ﬁrm has a positive ALPHA and zero otherwise 
ALPHA −_D Equal to one if the ﬁrm has a negative ALPHA and zero otherwise 
COUNT001 The difference of downside frequencies and upside frequencies of the ﬁrm-speciﬁc weekly residual returns 
exceeding k standard deviations above and below the mean, with k chosen to generate frequencies of 0.01% in 
the normal distribution 
DISCACC The value of discretionary accruals (deﬂated by lagged total assets). DISCACC is a performance-adjusted current 
accruals measure based on the method used in Dechow et al., (1995) . It is computed as: 
DISCAC C i,t = T A i,t /Total Asset s i,t−1 − NT A i,t 
where: 
TA i,t is the value of total accruals of the ﬁrm i in year t . 
TA i,t is given by: TA i,t =Net Income i,t - Net Operating Cash Flow i,t 
where: Net Income is the net income before extraordinary items and preferred dividends (datatype: WC01551), 
Net Operating Cash Flow is the cash ﬂow from operating activities adjusted for extraordinary items and 
discontinued operations (datatype: WC04860), Total Assets are total assets (datatype: WC02999). 
NTA i,t is the value of normal total current accruals of the ﬁrm i in year t . It has been estimated in two steps. 
At ﬁrst, we estimate the following cross-sectional regression model for each of the INDUSTRY -year combinations 
on available data (upon a minimum of 30 ﬁrm-year observations): 
T A i,t /T otal Asset s i,t−1 = α0 ∗ (1 /T otal Asset s i,t−1 ) + β1 ∗ (Net Sale s i,t /Total Asset s i,t−1 ) 
+ β2 ∗ P P E i.t−1 /Total Asset s i,t−1 ) + ε i,t 
where: Net Sales are SALES, PPE is the Gross Property, Plant and Equipment. It is computed by: Net Property, Plant 
and Equipment (WC02501) less Depreciation, Depletion, and Amortization (WC01151). 
Afterwards, using parameter estimates a 0, b 1 , and b 2 from the previous equation, NTA i,t are computed as follows: 
NT A i,t /T otal Asset s i,t−1 = a 0 ∗ (1 /T otal Asset s i,t−1 ) + b 1 ∗ ( ( Net Sale s i,t − A R i,t ) /Total Asset s i,t−1 ) 
+ b 2 ∗ (P P E i.t−1 /Total Asset s i,t−1 ) 
where: AR denotes the change in accounts receivables. 
Source: Worldscope. Datatype in parenthesis 
DISCACC_ABS The absolute value of DISCACC 
DISCACC_ABS_MS3y The 3 years moving sum of DISCACC_ABS 
DISPOSABLE INCOME The household disposable income. 
It is computed as follows: 
DISPOSABLE INCOME = Primary Income −Current Taxes −Social Contributions + Social Beneﬁts + Other Net Transfers 
where: 
Primary Income = Gross Operating Surplus + Gross Mixed Income + Income from Employment + Financial Income 
(Equity Income + Non-Equity Income). 
Source: ISTAT 
DISTANCE The shortest spherical distance between two points on the Earth’s surface in kilometers. 
Formally, let ( θ s , λs ) and ( θ f , λf ) be the geographical latitude and longitude of two points, a base standpoint S and 
the destination fore point F respectively. The DISTANCE d s,f between S and F is computed as: 
d s, f = arc cos { cos ( l o n s − l o n f ) ∗ cos ( la t s ) ∗ cos ( la t f ) + sin ( la t s ) ∗ sin ( la t f ) } ∗ 2 π r/ 360 
where: r is the radius of the earth ( ≈ 6378 km) 
EQUITY BOOK VALUE Book value of common equity. Source: Worldscope (datatype: WC03501) 
EQUITY MARKET VALUE Market value of common equity. Source: Worldscope (datatype: WC08001) 
FIRM AGE The number of years of a ﬁrm’s life since foundation. Source: Il Calepino dell’Azionista 
FIRM SIZE Total asset. Source: Worldscope (datatype: WC02999) 
HighEQ_D Equal to one if the ﬁrm EQ is below the cross-sectional median and zero otherwise 
I The Johnson and Zimmer index of dispersion. 
Formally, given the two-dimensional Euclidean space E 2 , let the generic point i and a sample of r random points 
in E 2 , all individuated by the latitude and longitude geographical coordinates, the Johnson and Zimmer 
dispersion index I for the point i is computed as: 
I = 
(r+1) 
r ∑ 
r=1 & r  = i
(d 4 
i,r 
) 
[
r ∑ 
r=1 & r  = i
(d 2 
i,r 
) 
]2 
where: d i,r is the DISTANCE between the point i and each of the r -points. 
( continued on next page ) 
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Table A.1 ( continued ) 
Variable Description 
The expected value of I has a value approaching two for a random distribution, lower than two for scattered 
distribution and higher than two for an aggregated distribution. 
In the weighted version of I, d i,r in the numerator has to be multiplied by w i,r 
2 , while d i,r in the denominator is 
multiplied by w i,r , where: w i,r is the weight of d i,r 
I_FIRM The yearly Johnson and Zimmer dispersion index computed on the geographical locations (i.e., latitude and 
longitude) of the issuing ﬁrm headquarters and the headquarters of all other sampled listed ﬁrms 
I_INCOME The yearly weighted Johnson and Zimmer dispersion index computed on geographical locations (i.e., latitude and 
longitude) of the issuing ﬁrm headquarters and all provincial capital cities, with weights equal to the 
normalized provincial per capita DISPOSABLE INCOME 
IDIOSYN The idiosyncratic risk or ﬁrm-speciﬁc volatility as deﬁned by the logistic transformation of R 2 . 
It is computed as follows: 
I DI OSY N = ln ( 1 −R 2 
R 2 
) 
where R 2 s are calculated from the ALPHA equation 
INDUSTRY Industry SIC Code (datatype: WC07024 and FTAG4) 
LowEQ_D Equal to one if the ﬁrm EQ is above the cross-sectional median and zero otherwise 
MARKET-TO-BOOK The ratio of EQUITY MARKET VALUE to EQUITY BOOK VALUE 
NCSKEW The negative RESIDUAL SKEWNESS divided by the cubed RESIDUAL STANDARD DEVIATION 
PRESS COVERAGE The yearly number of newspaper articles concerning the corresponding ﬁrm. Source: Il Sole 24 Ore 
R2 The R 2 computed from the ALPHA equation 
R&D Research and development expense. Source: Worldscope (datatype: WC01201) 
R&D_D Equal to one if the ﬁrm does not report R&D and zero otherwise 
R&D TO SALES The ratio of R&D to SALES 
REDCA The value of discretionary accruals (deﬂated by lagged total assets). REDCA is a performance-adjusted current 
accruals measure based on the method used in Ashbaugh et al., (2003) . It is computed as: 
RE DC A i,t = T C A i,t − E PT C A i,t 
where: 
TCA i,t is the value of total current accruals of the ﬁrm i in year t . TCA i,t is given by: 
T C A i,t = ( Current Assets ) i,t /T otal Asset s i,t−1 − ( Current Liabilities ) i,t /T otal Asset s i,t−1 − ( Cash ) i,t /T otal Asset s i,t−1 
+ ( Shor t Ter m and Cur rent LongTer m Debt ) i,t /Total Asset s i,t−1 
where: 
 is the ﬁrst difference (with respect to time) operator, 
Current Assets is the sum of cash and equivalents, receivables, inventories, prepaid expenses and other current 
assets (datatype: WC02201). 
Current Liabilities represents debt or other obligations that the company expects to satisfy within one year 
(datatype: WC03101). 
Cash represents the sum of cash and short-term investments (datatype: WC02001). 
Short Term and Current Long Term Debt represents that portion of ﬁnancial debt payable within one year 
including current portion of long-term debt and sinking fund requirements of preferred stock or debentures 
(datatype: WC03051). 
Total Assets are total assets (datatype: WC02999). 
EPTCA i ,t is the value of expected performance-adjusted ( ROA ) total current accruals of the ﬁrm i in year t . 
It has been estimated in two steps. At ﬁrst, we estimate the following cross-sectional regression model for each of 
the INDUSTRY -year combinations on available data (upon a minimum of 30 ﬁrm-year observations): 
T C A i,t = β1 ∗ (1 /Total Asset s i,t−1 ) + β2 ∗ (Net Sale s i,t /Total Asset s i,t−1 ) + β3 ∗ RO A i.t−1 
+ β4 ∗ In f latio n i.t−1 + β5 ∗ GDPgrowt h i.t−1 + ε i,t 
where: 
Net Sales are SALES 
ROA is computed as operating income after taxes (datatype: WC08326) relative to Total Assets 
Afterwards, using parameter estimates b 1 -b 5 from the previous equation, EPTCA i ,t is computed as follows: 
EPT C A i,t = b 1 ∗ (1 /Total Asset s i,t−1 ) + b 2 ∗ (Net Sale s i,t − A R i,t ) /Total Asset s i,t + b 3 ∗ RO A i.t−1 
+ b 4 ∗ In f latio n i.t−1 + b 5 ∗ GDPgrowt h i.t−1 
where: 
AR denotes the change in accounts receivables. 
Source: Worldscope. Datatype in parentheses 
REDCA_3(5)(7)y The moving 3(5)(7) years standard deviation of REDCA 
RESIDUAL RETURN The weekly residual return computed as the ɛ i,w,t of the ALPHA equation 
RESIDUAL SKEWNESS The yearly skewness of RESIDUAL RETURN 
RESIDUAL STANDARD DEVIATION The yearly standard deviation of RESIDUAL RETURN 
ROE The ratio of the ﬁrm net proﬁt income to the EQUITY BOOK VALUE . Source: Datastream (datatype: DWRE) 
SALES Net sales or revenues. Source: Worldscope (datatype: WC01001) 
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